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20 October, 2021

Relationship Banking

 Relationship Banking is a strategy used by banks to enhance their profitability. They accomplish this by cross-selling  financial  products  and  services  to  strengthen  their  relationships  with  customers  and increase customer loyalty. Relationship banking involves offering customers a broad array of financial products and services that go beyond simple checking and savings accounts.

In  addition  to  these  two  basic  products,  relationship-banking  products  may  include  certificates  of deposit,  safe  deposit  boxes,  insurance,  investments,  credit  cards,  loans  and business  services  (e.g., credit card processing). They may also include specialized financial products designed for specific demographics, such as students, seniors or the wealthy.

Merits and Demerits of Relationship Banking

Relationship  banking  can  add  value  through  its  contractual  features  that,  though  mostly  implicit, facilitate long-term relations (Ferri, Kang and Kim, 2001; Hoshi and Patrick, 2000).5

   Monitoring costs are economized through reciprocal delegated monitoring among credit suppliers, virtually making the loans of a relationship bank subordinate to other banks’ loans and public debt.

   Inefficient closures of distressed but economically solvent firms are prevented, and cases of corporat e financial distress are effectively resolved.

   Liquidity  constraints  are mitigated  and business  risks shared between  a relationship  bank and its corporate clients over their cycles of cash flows and profits, since loans are made from a long -term perspective.


    Potential conflicts of interest between the creditor bank and shareholders are controlled through the holding of corporate shares by a relationship bank, easing the problem of asset substitution (investment decisions  biased  towards  projects  that  enrich  stockholders  at thexpense  of debtholders;  Prowse,1990).

However,  relationship  banking  is  not  without  potential  perils,  which  must  be  minimized  by  sound business judgment and discipline (Ferri, Kang and Kim, 2001; Hoshi and Patrick, 2000).

   Investment efficiency can be low due to soft-budget constraints. That is, given the good chance of loan renegotiations with their banks, firms with a relationship bank may have weaker ex ante incentives to boost their effort (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996).

   A relationship bank might extract rents from its clients in the form of higher lending rates and others

because they are informationally captured and have difficulties turning to other financing sources.

   Firms with a relationship bank may take too few risks in their businesses, as the bank will discourage investment projects with both high return and high risk.

   The system of relationship banking is often supported by heavy government regulation of the financial markets, which delays capital market (including the market for corporate control) development and results in inefficiency in the banking sector.